TEHRAN- After decades of lecturing Iran over its nuclear programme, European powers are embracing nuclear deterrence, participating in simulated nuclear warfare and even contemplating the development of their own atomic weapons. The question is no longer simply whether Iran's nuclear programme is peaceful, but why the rules of international security appear to apply differently to Tehran and European capitals.
For decades, European governments have positioned themselves as guardians of nuclear non-proliferation, repeatedly questioning Iran's nuclear ambitions, imposing political and economic pressure, and demanding restrictions on its nuclear programme. Yet, as Europe increasingly prepares for a potential nuclear confrontation and considers expanding its own nuclear capabilities, an uncomfortable question emerges: by what logic can European countries claim the right to pursue nuclear deterrence while denying Iran the right to determine the means of safeguarding its own security?
A recent report by "German Foreign Policy", published on October 15 under the headline "Europe, a nuclear-armed continent", offers a revealing account of this apparent contradiction. It describes an accelerating trend towards the militarisation of Europe's security architecture, including participation in nuclear warfare exercises, discussions about deploying additional American nuclear weapons on European soil, and renewed calls for Germany and other European countries to consider developing their own nuclear weapons.
The developments expose not only Europe's changing security priorities but also the profound double standards underpinning its longstanding approach to Iran's nuclear programme.
The hypocrisy of Europe's nuclear double standards
For years, European governments have been at the forefront of international efforts to restrict Iran's nuclear programme, frequently invoking concerns that Tehran might eventually seek to develop nuclear weapons. These accusations have provided political justification for sanctions, diplomatic pressure and repeated attempts to impose additional restrictions on Iran's nuclear activities.
Yet the same European capitals are now moving in a remarkably different direction when it comes to their own nuclear ambitions.
According to German Foreign Policy, Germany is participating in NATO's annual Steadfast Noon nuclear warfare exercise, alongside 16 other NATO members. The exercise involves operational preparations for the simulated deployment of nuclear bombs. The Bundeswehr is also participating for the first time in France's nuclear exercise, Operation Poker.
Meanwhile, Finland has moved to remove its longstanding legal prohibition on hosting or transporting nuclear weapons, while Lithuania is pursuing a similar constitutional change. Discussions about potentially stationing American nuclear weapons in Poland have also gained momentum.
Perhaps even more significant is the growing debate over an independent European nuclear weapons capability. German foreign policy circles have begun openly discussing the possibility of a German or jointly developed European nuclear arsenal, potentially involving Scandinavian and Baltic countries.
The contrast is striking. When Iran develops its nuclear technology under international safeguards, European governments portray it as a potential threat to international security. When European countries expand their nuclear military cooperation and contemplate acquiring additional nuclear capabilities, the same developments are presented as legitimate responses to security concerns.
If nuclear capabilities are inherently destabilising when pursued by Iran, why do they suddenly become instruments of stability when pursued by European countries?
Security for Europe, insecurity for Iran?
The underlying contradiction goes beyond nuclear policy. It reflects a broader European understanding of international security in which some countries are considered entitled to strengthen their deterrence capabilities, while others are expected to accept limitations on their security choices.
French President Emmanuel Macron's declaration in March that Europe was entering a new "age of nuclear weapons" is particularly revealing. His proposed advanced deterrence concept involves the possible temporary deployment of French nuclear-capable Rafale aircraft at bases in other European countries. The objective, according to the report, is to create uncertainty for potential adversaries and complicate their military calculations.
In other words, Europe increasingly views nuclear deterrence as an essential component of its security.
Germany, meanwhile, is questioning whether dependence on American nuclear protection is sufficient. Political scientist Joachim Krause, a former head of the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University, has argued that Germany should consider its own or European nuclear weapons. He has even suggested that possessing an atomic bomb would provide Germany with an additional element of security.
This raises a fundamental question: if nuclear deterrence is considered necessary for Germany's protection, why should Iran be expected to surrender every option that could contribute to its national security?
Iran operates in a considerably more volatile security environment than most European countries. It faces decades of American sanctions, persistent military threats, repeated acts of sabotage, assassinations of its officials and scientists, and direct military attacks involving the United States and Israel. Its geographical neighbourhood is also characterised by extensive foreign military deployments and the presence of nuclear-armed states.
These are not abstract security concerns. They are part of Iran's recent experience.
European governments cannot reasonably expect Tehran to disregard these realities while simultaneously embracing the argument that their own deteriorating security environment justifies greater reliance on nuclear weapons.
Security cannot be treated as an exclusive privilege reserved for powerful countries. Nor can the principle of deterrence be considered legitimate for one group of nations and inherently unacceptable for another.
Why is Iran expected to accept a different set of rules?
Perhaps the most important question raised by Europe's nuclear shift concerns the future of the international non-proliferation regime itself.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) establishes obligations concerning the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation, the peaceful use of nuclear energy and progress towards nuclear disarmament. Iran, as a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the treaty, has consistently maintained that its nuclear programme is intended for peaceful purposes and that it is entitled to develop nuclear technology under the treaty's provisions.
The European powers, meanwhile, have increasingly embraced nuclear deterrence as an indispensable instrument of their own security. France and the United Kingdom already possess nuclear arsenals, while several other European NATO members participate in nuclear-sharing arrangements involving American weapons.
The problem is not simply that Europe possesses nuclear weapons or participates in deterrence arrangements. It is that European governments continue to approach the nuclear question through a framework that appears to grant themselves considerable strategic flexibility while demanding increasingly restrictive commitments from Iran.
The disparity becomes even more difficult to justify when the respective security environments are considered.
Iran faces threats from countries that possess overwhelming conventional military capabilities and, in the case of Israeli regime, an undeclared nuclear arsenal. It has also experienced direct military aggression from the United States and Israel. Meanwhile, European countries are increasingly citing the possibility of a confrontation with Russia as justification for strengthening their nuclear deterrence.
If the prospect of a potential conflict is sufficient to justify expanding Europe's nuclear capabilities, how can Iran's much more immediate and tangible security concerns be dismissed?
And if nuclear weapons are being presented as the ultimate guarantee of sovereignty and national survival, what alternative security guarantees are actually being offered to countries such as Iran?
A dangerous lesson for the international order
Europe's evolving nuclear posture sends a deeply troubling message to the rest of the world: international rules and non-proliferation commitments can be interpreted flexibly when the security interests of powerful countries are at stake.
This approach risks undermining the very international framework that European governments have repeatedly invoked in their dealings with Iran. It also raises serious questions about the credibility of European diplomacy and its ability to act as an impartial participant in negotiations over nuclear issues.
Ultimately, the issue is not whether Iran should acquire nuclear weapons. The right to peaceful nuclear technology, the question of nuclear weapons acquisition, and the broader right of every nation to defend its sovereignty are separate matters that should not be deliberately conflated.
The real question is why Europe believes it can determine the security requirements of other nations while reserving for itself the freedom to pursue whatever military capabilities it considers necessary.
If nuclear deterrence is a legitimate response to insecurity, then European governments must explain why Iran's security concerns deserve less consideration than their own. If nuclear militarisation is dangerous and destabilising, they must apply that principle consistently, rather than using it selectively as a political instrument against countries they regard as adversaries.
Europe cannot spend decades demanding that Iran demonstrate restraint while simultaneously preparing for a nuclear confrontation of its own.
The world cannot be expected to accept a system in which the powerful are entitled to pursue nuclear deterrence, while the less powerful are told that their security must depend on the goodwill of those same powers.