The story: In a turn that has raised eyebrows, Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi has dismissed Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) chief Hamid Al-Shatri. The move has left one of the country’s most sensitive posts without a permanent head. While the premier is reportedly running the service himself in the interim, competing accounts suggest members of the ruling Shiite Coordination Framework or a Sunni party are vying for the vacancy. Part of a wider security reshuffle, observers suggest the dismissal could hamstring Iraq’s complex regional diplomacy at a delicate time.

The coverage: The state-run Iraqi News Agency reported on Oct. 26 that Zaidi had ended Shatri’s tenure as director of the INIS.

  • The same day, an unnamed lawmaker told Qatari-linked Al-Araby Al-Jadeed the position would stay with the Coordination Framework in a quota-based reshuffle, with Zaidi running the service in the meantime.

A different account pointed to disagreement within the ruling alliance. A Coordination Framework source told Ultra Iraq on Oct. 26 that influential parties want Border Ports Authority chief Omar Al-Waeli for the position, describing him as “acceptable and favored” by Iran.

  • The source alleged that a camp “aligned with the US vision” opposes Waeli, naming Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haq leader Qais Al-Khazali and Kata'ib Al-Imam Ali head Shibl Al-Zaydi as prominent faces of such a network. Notably, both Khazali and Zaydi pledged in June to place their weapons under state control.

  • The source further claimed that some actors in the alliance have considered handing the post to former parliament speaker Mohammed Al-Halbousi’s Sunni Takaddum Front, with Islamic Supreme Council leader Humam Hamoudi reportedly proposing a compromise candidate.

  • An official statement cut the other way. On Oct. 27, the government’s Security Media Cell denied claims in circulation that the government intended to appoint a figure from “a specific region or party.”

Shatri’s sudden dismissal has prompted questions among Iraqi commentators on Twitter/X over its timing and motives.

  • Zaidi arrived in Damascus on Oct. 28, where Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa received him at the airport. It was the first visit by an Iraqi prime minister since the fall of former Syrian president Bashar Al-Assad (2000–2024) in Dec. 2024.

  • Journalist Waleed Ibrahim wrote that removing the official who had led Iraq’s rapprochement with Syria’s new rulers, just before Zaidi’s Damascus visit, “Raises more than one question mark.”

When news of the dismissal broke, Iraqi observer Ghaith Al-Tamimi listed Shatri’s ouster among what he called the premier’s “absurd” decisions at “a very dangerous time.”

  • Independent politician Najeh Al-Mizan claimed, without evidence, that Zaidi had sidelined Shatri at the suggestion of Laith Al-Khazali. The latter was approved as deputy prime minister on Oct. 15, and is notably a brother of the Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq chief.

Speaking to Al-Araby Al-Jadeed on Oct. 26, security analyst Ahmed Al-Nuaimi said Zaidi’s earlier picks for senior security posts favored independents or figures removed from factional politics.

  • The analyst suggested that the INIS’s failure to confront Iran-backed armed factions may have hastened Shatri’s exit, citing recent attacks against Saudi Arabia launched from Iraq. Notable incidents include a Sept. 11 strike on the Kingdom’s East-West oil pipeline.

  • Baghdad Governor Atwan Al-Atwani took a different view, arguing on iNews TV on Oct. 26 that the premier removed Shatri to install a figure who would carry out his orders.

The context/analysis: Shatri’s removal is part of a wider shake-up of Iraq’s security leadership since Zaidi took office in May.

  • In July, the prime minister revived the Office of the Commander-in-Chief, merging three senior security bodies into it, and appointed new heads of the Counter-Terrorism Service and the federal police.

  • Further changes could be extensive. Mansour Al-Baiji, an MP from the Reconstruction and Development Coalition of former prime minister Muhammad Shia’ Al-Sudani (2022-26), said on Oct. 28 that they could encompass 50 posts and extend to directors within the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU).

Zaidi’s temporary charge of the INIS follows a precedent set by his two predecessors, both of whom personally headed the spy service for much of their premierships.

  • Appointed intelligence chief in June 2016, former prime minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi (2020-22) retained control of the INIS after assuming the premiership in May 2020. He only handed the service to his chief of staff, Raid Juhi, in July 2022—three months before stepping down.

  • Kadhimi’s successor, Sudani, took office on Oct. 28, 2022, removed Juhi on Nov. 1 and on Nov. 6 placed the INIS under his “direct personal supervision.”

Control of the civilian spy agency has long carried political weight beyond the intelligence portfolio.

  • Iran-aligned armed groups accused Kadhimi of “tightening his grip” on the service after the then-premier dismissed officials close to such actors in Jan. 2021.

  • Sudani’s appointment of Shatri in Dec. 2024 was widely read as a concession to the Coordination Framework, which had backed his government.

Shatri also gave the post a growing diplomatic role after Assad’s government fell in Dec. 2024, becoming Baghdad’s main security channel to the new Sunni-dominated leadership in Damascus.

  • Shatri met Sharaa, then Syria’s de facto leader, in Damascus on Dec. 26, 2024. The engagement drew a backlash from Iraq’s Shiite establishment. He returned to Syria at least twice for talks on security, border control and trade.

  • Taken together, Zaidi’s dismissal of Shatri appears consistent with his broader effort to put his own stamp on the state’s security leadership.

The future: Citing Shiite political sources, the independent daily Al-Mada reported on Oct. 28 that Iran-allied armed factions are seeking sensitive posts, foremost among them the INIS, in exchange for relinquishing their weapons under an understanding with Zaidi.

  • The newspaper added that the terms of such a deal remain vague, and that Zaidi will run the INIS in an acting capacity for now. A posts-for-weapons deal of that kind could entrench and further institutionalize the power of armed groups rather than curb it.

Beyond the domestic implications, the choice of successor could also carry a signal abroad.

  • With Zaidi visiting Syria and analysts linking Shatri’s exit to the recent attacks on Saudi Arabia from Iraqi territory, a Takaddum Front nominee or another Sunni appointee could be read in Damascus and Riyadh as a change of approach, not only a quota decision.

  • Conversely, a Coordination Framework-backed figure reportedly seen as acceptable to Tehran, including border ports chief Waeli, could indicate that the position remains part of bargaining within the ruling Shiite alliance.

  • Zaidi’s ultimate decision may show whether his wider security reshuffle is reducing factional influence over senior posts or mainly redistributing positions among political allies.